Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 13 by James R. Hines Jr.
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Tax Policy and the Economy, volume 13
Volume Author/Editor: James M. Poterba, editor
Volume Publisher: MIT Press
Volume ISBN: 0-262-66150-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/pote99-2
Publication Date: January 1999
Chapter Title: Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business
Income Tax
Chapter Author: James R. Hines Jr.
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10921




James R. Hines Jr.
University of Michigan and NBER
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
American non-profit organizations are generally exempt from federal
income tax, with the exception that profits earned from activities that are
"unrelated" to exempt purposes are subject to the Unrelated Business
Income Tax (UBIT). The UBIT is intended to prevent "unfair" competi-
tion between tax-exempt non-profits and taxable for-profit firms, and
also to prevent erosion of the federal tax base through tax-motivated
transactions between taxable and tax-exempt entities. The evidence indi-
cates that American non-profit organizations engage in very little unre-
lated business activity, paying aggregate UBIT of less than $200 million
annually. Large non-profit organizations, and those with pressing finan-
cial needs due to high program-related expenses and low receipts of
contributions and government grants, are the most likely to have unre-
lated business income. The same organizational characteristics are not
associated with earning income from inventory sales that are "related"
to exempt purposes. This evidence suggests that non-profits incur impor-
I thank Jeffrey Brown and Austin Nichols for excellent research assistance, James Poterba
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tant organizational costs in undertaking unrelated business activity,
since unrelated business income is concentrated among organizations
facing the strongest financial pressures. This, in turn, carries implica-
tions for the efficiency of the UBIT as a source of tax revenue and for the
need to tax the business income of non-profit organizations in order to
prevent "unfair" competition.
1. INTRODUCTION
Charitable non-profit organizations in the U.S. that are eligible for tax
exemptions under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) include reli-
gious, educational, charitable, scientific, and literary organizations.
These charitable non-profits spent $548 billion on their activities in 1994
(the most recent year for which comprehensive data are available),
which represents roughly 8 percent of gross domestic product. This is a
sizable figure, particularly since it omits most religious organizations
(which do not report their finances to the government) and since spend-
ing includes only the compensated portion of non-profit labor, much of
which is provided to non-profits at zero or below-market wages.
Non-profit organizations commonly express concern over the difficul-
ties they confront in financing their many activities. Funding for charita-
ble non-profit organizations comes largely from program service reve-
nues, which generated $422 billion in 1994, or 72 percent of their total
receipts of $587 billion. Other sources of funds include contributions ($58
billion), government grants ($52 billion), and various types of income
from investments.1
Non-profit organizations are generally exempt from federal and state
income taxes, which distinguishes them from most other private
entitiessuch as corporations, which are currently subject to a federal
income tax of 35 percent. The tax exemption for non-profits has several
important aspects. One is that income earned by non-profits is largely
exempt from tax. A second is that individuals and corporations making
qualifying donations to 501(c)(3) organizations are entitled to claim tax
deductions for their contributions.
Non-profit organizations in the U.S. are not eligible for blanket tax
exemptions; instead, organizations must apply for and receive tax-
exempt status from the U.S. government, and tax exemptions, if
granted, are limited. American laws constrain the operating activities
and financial behavior of organizations that wish to retain tax-exempt
status, and impose taxes on certain activities of non-profit organizations
1Hilgert (1998) reports aggregate financial information for 501(c)(3) organizations in 1994.Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business Income Tax 59
that are otherwise tax-exempt. This paper evaluates one such tax: the
Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT).
The United States introduced in 1950 a new tax on the "unrelated
business income" of certain non-profit organizations. Congress enacted
the UBIT out of concern over the possibility of "unfair competition"
between taxable business entities and non-profit organizations engaging
in the same, or similar, activities. The UBIT has been controversial since
its enactment, coming under fire from some critics who claim that it
imposes unnecessary burdens on non-profit organizations and others
who argue that its scope is insufficiently broad. The purpose of this
paper is to review some of the issues raised by the UBIT and to evaluate
its effect on charitable non-profit organizations in the U.S.
Certain aspects of the UBIT are clear from the outset. The UBIT raises
very little direct revenue for the federal government, the most recent
available annual figure (for 1994) being $195 million. The primary func-
tion of the UBIT is to discourage (though not eliminate) unrelated busi-
ness activity on the part of charitable non-profits. In doing so, the UBIT
reduces the likeithood that non-profit organizations wifi compete with
taxpaying firms in similar lines of business. The UBIT thereby also main-
tains that portion of the corporate tax base that would otherwise become
the province of tax-exempt entities. Some organizations with opportuni-
ties to earn unrelated business income that would be subject to the UBIT
opt instead to seek alternative methods of financing their activities and,
in some cases, to scale back their program-related expenditures.
The empirical work in this paper analyzes the characteristics of organi-
zations with and without unrelated business income in order to identify
characteristics of non-profit organizations that are correlated with unre-
lated business activity. The results suggest that large organizations are
the most likely to have unrelated business income, and that, controlling
for asset size, unrelated business activity is concentrated among organi-
zations with high program-related expenses and those receiving few
contributions and government grants. This pattern suggests that unre-
lated business activity is undertaken largely by organizations with both
business opportunities and pressing financial needs. Put differently,
American non-profit organizations appear to prefer not to undertake
unrelated business activity unless driven to do so by financial necessity.
The difficulty with such an interpretation of the evidence is that the
correlations evident in the data need not be causal. An organization with
the ability to generate unrelated business income may, all other things
equal, be less inclined than other organizations to seek outside funding in
the form of contributions or government grants, and may be more willing
than others to spend money on active programs. Furthermore, unrelated60Hines
business activity may discourage private contributors and government
granting agencies from providing funds. Since fundraising, program
spending, and other operational aspects of non-profit organizations repre-
sent endogenous choices, the direction of causality is not entirely clear.
In order to address the issue of causality, the empirical work in this
paper compares organizational characteristicsassociated with earning
unrelated business income with characteristics associated with earning
profits from sales of inventory items. The patterns differ greatly: while
large organizations are the most likely to generate both types of revenue,
organizations receiving higher levels of contributions and government
grants, and organizations with lower levels of program spending, are
considerably more likely to generate income from sales of inventory
items. It appears that it is not commercialism per se that exhibits a
positive correlation with program spending and a negative correlation
with the receipt of contributions and grants, but a particular form of
commercialism that is unrelated to exempt purposes. Such a pattern is
consistent with a general reluctance on the part of non-profit organiza-
tions to engage in unrelated business activities.
This evidence implies that fear of "unfair" competition in the market-
place from non-profit organizations, even in the absence of the UBIT, is
generally misplaced. Of course, with so many available definitions of
"fairness," this issue is difficult entirely to resolve. Analysis of their
incentives indicates that non-profit organizations have no reason to oper-
ate unrelated businesses used for investment purposes any differently
than would taxable for-profit competitors in the same lines of business.
The tax exemption augments a non-profit's available resources for busi-
ness investment; but so, too, do earnings in the otherbusiness lines of a
large (for-profit) conglomerate, yet the "fairness" issue is seldom raised
in the second case. And the evidence suggests that non-profit organiza-
tions are generally less eager than their for-profit counterparts to under-
take business ventures unrelated to their charitable purposes, typically
doing so only when pushed by financial necessity.
From a tax policy standpoint, it has been noted that the UBIT removes
the tax incentive non-profit organizations would otherwise have to own
and operate corporate entities instead of merely owning their shares. In
the absence of a UBIT, the corporate tax can be avoided by undertaking
business activity entirely within a non-profit organization. The UBIT
introduces at least as many distortions as it removes, however, since
non-profit organizations do not pay taxes on most of their capital in-
come. Introduction of the UBIT widens the taxwedge between earning
capital income in the form of interest and earning income from unrelated
business activities. In addition, the UBIT is the source of extensive corn-Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business Income Tax61
pliance and enforcement difficulties that stem from the vagueness of
operational distinctions between business income that is "related" and
"unrelated" to charitable purposes, and from the difficulty of allocating
joint costs between charitable and business operations.
Section 2 reviews the tax treatment of income earned by non-profit
organizations. Section 3 evaluates the incentives created by the UBIT
and their implications for the efficiency of resource allocation. Section 4
considers aggregate patterns of unrelated business activity by non-profit
organizations. Section 5 analyzes the commercial behavior of individual
non-profit organizations, devoting special attention to the differing char-
acteristics of organizations with unrelated business income and those
with income from selling inventory items that are related to their charita-
ble purposes. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2. THE (LIMITED) TAX EXEMPTION
FOR NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
Organizations dedicated to various objectives deemed by Congress to be
sufficiently worthy are granted exemptions from federal and state in-
come taxes. There are two important aspects of this exemption: the first is
that organizations must receive their exemptions from the U.S. Treasury;
for this they must apply, and many applications are denied. The second
is that the exemption is partial: not all activities of non-profit organiza-
tions are exempt from federal income tax. Once a 501(c)(3) organization
has a tax exemption, qualifying contributions are deductible against the
taxable incomes of contributors, so tax exemptions are valuable quite
beyond the ability they confer to avoid tax on business income.
The U.S. corporate income tax was introduced in 1913, at which time
non-profit organizations were granted exemptions from the tax.2 In the
late 1940s, public outcry over various business acquisitions by some
highly visible non-profit organizations motivated Congress to reevaluate
the tax exemption for non-profits. In 1950, Congress introduced the
UBIT, to which non-profit organizations are subject. The UBIT is very
similar in structure and rate to the corporate income tax, with the differ-
ence that it applies only to certain sources of income.
The UBIT is a tax on income earned in a manner that is "unrelated" to
a non-profit organization's charitable purpose. Thus, art museums are
not required to pay UBIT on profits earned from sales of art reproduc-
2See Bittker and Randert (1976) for a survey of the history of the exemption of non-profit
organizations from federal income taxation. Simon (1987) reviews the taxation of non-
profit organizations more generally.62Hines
tions in museum shops. But art museums are required to pay UBIT on
profits earned from sales in their shops of "unrelated" items, such as
magazines or pain relievers. Ticket sales for its college football games are
not taxable to a university, but income generated by renting its sports
facility to a professional team is subject to the UBIT. Advertising revenue
is generally taxable under the UBIT. Most types of capital income are
explicitly exempted from the UBIT, so that, for example, educational
institutions are not subject to UBIT on interest, dividends, and capital
gains earned by their endowment funds. An important exception is that
debt-financed investments are subject to the UBIT.
The fact that a non-profit organization uses the income that it earns to
further its exempt purpose does not imply that any income-earning ac-
tivities are therefore "related" to the purpose and consequently exempt
from the UBIT. Income is subject to the UBIT based on the way in which
it is earned, not the way in which it is used. The UBIT provisions are
intended to prevent "unfair" competition between non-profit organiza-
tions and taxable competitors and to protect the integrity of the tax base
from erosion due to tax-motivated transactions between taxed and un-
taxed entities. There are, however, many practical difficulties that arise
in distinguishing "related" from "unrelated" income,3 as well as in identi-
fying debt-financed investments that are designed to exploit a non-profit
organization's tax-exempt status for investment purposes. The govern-
ment can remove the tax-exempt status of organizations earning exces-
sive unrelated business income, and this possibility, together with vari-
ous differences between the UBIT and the regular corporate tax, has
motivated some non-profits to locate income-generating activities in
wholly-owned taxable subsidiaries that are subject to corporate taxation.
3. EFFICIENCY CONSEQUENCES OF THE UBIT
The UBIT applies to a subset of the commercial activities of non-profit
organizations. The controversy over this tax focuses on two issues. The
first concerns whether, in the absence of the UBIT, tax-exempt non-
profit organizations would have "unfair" commercial advantages over
for-profit, taxpaying firms engaged in the same or similar lines of busi-
ness. The second is whether the UBIT in its current form improves the
efficiency of resource allocation over a situation (such as that prior to
1950) in which the unrelated business incomes of non-profit organiza-
tions are entirely exempt from federal tax.
See, for example, U.S. General Accounting Office (1987, pp. 24-25), describing the
difficulties facing the IRS in determining the "relatedness" of various income-producing
activities and costs appropriately deducted against "unrelated" business income.Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business Income Tax63
The fairness issue is extremely difficult to evaluate, due in large part to
the absence of a consensus on what constitutes "unfair" commercial
advantages. Rose-Ackerman (1982) argues that competition between tax-
able for-profit firms and tax-exempt non-profits cannot, in equilibrium,
be unfair to taxable competing firms, since all market participants must
earn their required rates of return. While not concedingthat the corpo-
rate tax discourages investment by taxable firms, Rose-Ackerman argues
that, even if it does, the effect of exempting some but not all competitors
from taxation is to increase the number of tax-exempt entities in the
market without reducing the returns to taxable firms. This situation, she
argues, is not unfair to taxable firms that choose to competewith tax-
exempt entities, since such taxable firms must earn their required rates of
return in expectation or else they would not compete in those markets.
This interpretation of fairness is not popular in certain industry circles
and in some of the media coverage of this issue.4 There, the fairness
issue is commonly coupled with the idea that tax-exempt competitors
wifi be able to invest more, or to charge lower prices, or to provide better
services at the same prices, than their taxable counterparts. Their abffity
to do so, so the argument goes, stems from the resources and the incen-
tives generated by the tax exemption.
It is difficult to distinguish fairness concerns from efficiency issues in
many of these controversies. Hansmann (1989) argues thatfairness is-
sues are secondary to issues of efficiency. The two arecertainly related,
in that the effects of the UBIT on both fairness and efficiency turn on its
effects on the behavior of non-profit organizations in commercial mar-
kets with taxable competitors.
Efficiency has the virtue of being (in principle) well defined, but its
application to the analysis of the UBIT is greatly complicated by the nth-
best nature of economies with multiple tax distortions. It is, however,
straightforward to identify two issues related to the analysis of effi-
ciency. The first is the effect of the tax exemption, and the UBIT, on the
selection of commercial activities undertaken by non-profit organiza-
tions. The second is the effect of the UBIT on managerial decisions in
those unrelated business operations that non-profits undertake.
For purposes of analysis, it is useful to consider the (counterfactual)
case of a seamlessly enforced and operated UBIT that taxes onlythe
unrelated portion (somehow defined) of a non-profit organization's busi-
ness income and does so without imposing any undue administrative or
compliance costs. Non-profit organizations have the opportunity to un-
dertake any of a number of unrelated business operations. Suppose that
' See, for example, Pound, Cohen, and Loeb (1995).64Hines
non-profit organizations do not have any special cost advantages over
their taxable rivals, nor are they disadvantaged; they are on an equal
footing except for any advantage conferred by their exemption from
corporate income taxes.5
Rose-Ackerman (1982) makes the point that, if the alternative to invest-
ing in an unrelated business is instead to hold interest-bearing securi-
ties, then taxable and tax-exempt organizations wifi effectively face the
same cost of capital when they invest in unrelated businesses, even in
the absence of a UBIT. The opportunity cost of funds invested in busi-
ness capital is the interest that could otherwise have been earned had
the same money been used to buy bonds. For the purposes of this
calculation it does not matter that tax-exempt organizations keep all of
their returns while taxable ones keep only a fraction, since each wifi
invest in unrelated businesses only up to the point that they would not
do better by purchasing bonds instead.
Hansmann (1989) notes that, in Rose-Ackerman's analysis, it is critical
that the alternative to unrelated business investment is investment in
interest-bearing securities (or other assets the returns to which are fully
taxed when held by taxable investors). Hansmann compares the incen-
tives to invest in unrelated businesses with those to hold corporate stock,
and notes that the tax preference for unrealized capital gains on corporate
stock implies that taxable investors wifi concentrate their investments in
stock, while, in the absence of a UBIT, tax-exempt entities wifi concentrate
their investments in business assets. Viewed differently, tax-exempt en-
tities can avoid the corporate tax altogether by owning their business
investments directly instead of holding 100 percent of the stock of
taxpaying corporations. Taxable investors can also avoid the corporate tax
by financing their investments entirely with debt,6 but Hansmanncor-
rectly observes that equity is also an important source of finance and it is
therefore inappropriate to treat taxable investors as though they were
untaxed on their corporate investments. Hansmanri therefore concludes
that the tax incentive for non-profit organizations to invest in unrelated
businesses creates an inefficiency that the UBIT serves to rectify.
Sansing (1998) calls attention to the importance of cost allocation to this
analysis. If, in practice, non-profit organizations are free to allocateas
many of their general overhead costs as they wish against unrelated
The following analysis concerns only the effect of a non-profit organization's exemption
from the corporate income tax. The exemption from property, sales, and other taxes
creates incentives to locate highly taxed activity in the non-profit sector, as many observers
have noted.
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business income in calculating UBIT liabilities, then they wifi not face any
tax obligations under the UBIT and the tax therefore fails to prevent the
inefficiency noted by Hansmann. Sansing notes, however, that if instead
a non-profit faces important non-deductible costs of unrelated business
activitysuch as the cost to an organization's reputation, or its sense of
mission, from excessive commercializationthen the UBIT may reduce
efficiency by discouraging unrelated business activity that the organiza-
tion would otherwise undertake. The inefficiency arises because the
UBIT taxes the returns to unrelated business activity without allowing
deductions for important non-pecuniary costs. Non-profit organizations
may well differ from ordinary businesses in their sensitivity to such costs.
Cordes and Weisbrod (1998) offer some evidence on this point from
their examination of the information returns of a large sample of non-
profit organizations in 1992. They report that the ratio of public to private
contributions received by a non-profit organization is correlated with
whether the organization has unrelated business income, interpreting
this result to mean that public and private donors to non-profit organiza-
tions are sensitive (indeed, differentially so) to the commercialization of
their activities. Cordes and Weisbrod report a similar correlation between
contribution sources and the fraction of total revenue accounted for by
(tax-exempt) program service revenues, suggesting that it is not the "un-
relatedness" of business income, but instead the commercialization of
non-profit activity, to which donors are sensitive. Cordes and Weisbrod
also offer suggestive evidence that non-profit organizations allocate inter-
nal costs in a manner that reduces their UBIT liabilities.
As most observers appear to agree, the effect of the UBIT on the effi-
ciency of resource allocation is not so much a question of how non-profit
firms might manage any business operations that they run as one of the
extent to which non-profits choose to undertake unrelated business activ-
ity. Both Rose-Ackerman and Hansmann observe that non-profits and
for-profit firms face similar incentives to manage their business opera-
tions to maximize profits. Hansmann's main argument implies that a
non-profit organization might run an unrelated business somewhat differ-
ently than would a for-profit firm, since the non-profit has a lower cost of
capital. But this implication is misleading, since the opportunity cost a
non-profit organization incurs by investing in a given unrelated business
operation includes the cost of not investing in another. Consequently, if
the non-profit sector is small compared to the rest of the economy and
therefore has access to an effectively limitless supply of potential unre-
lated business investment opportunities, the implicit cost of capital for
any one business operation is the potential return elsewhere available,
which must equal the pre-tax cost of funds for taxable investors. Non-66Hines
profit organizations therefore do not have tax incentives to manage their
unrelated business operations any differently than do for-profit firms in
the same lines of business.
There is an incentive for tax-exempt organizations to concentrate their
investments in heavily-taxed assets, since equilibrium in a market domi-
nated by taxable investors implies that such investments have the high-
est pre-tax returns. (This argument does not, of course, imply that hives-
tors wifi specialize completely, since such a strategy would generally
conflict with diversification needs.) The UBIT therefore reduces the pref-
erence that non-profits would otherwise have for business investments
over ownership of corporate stock. But it does not follow that the UBIT
enhances efficiency, quite apart from the scenario identified by Sansing.
Corporate stock is not the only asset in which non-profits invest; indeed,
asset market equilibrium implies that corporate stock, which offers tax
advantages to taxable investors, should carry a low pre-tax rate of re-
turn, and therefore wifi represent a relatively small fraction of the invest-
ment portfolio of tax-exempt entities.7 Nonprofit organizations have in-
centives to concentrate their investments in bonds and other assets the
returns of which are highly taxedand that the market prices accord-
ingly. Subjecting the unrelated business income of non-profit organiza-
tions to the UBIT then serves to discourage unrelated business activity to
an inefficient degree. In the absence of the UBIT, non-profit organiza-
tions face the same incentives that taxable investors face in allocating
funds between investments in bonds and investments in unrelated busi-
nesses. Introduction of the UBIT changes these incentives. Since non-
profit organizations invest in many asset types, with differing tax charac-
teristics, a simple comparison of incentives to invest in corporate stock
and incentives to invest in unrelated business assets is insufficient to
evaluate the efficiency effects of the UBIT.
4. AGGREGATE PATTERNS OF UNRELATED
BUSINESS INCOME AND UBIT
This section considers the available aggregate evidence of the characteris-
tics of unrelated business income earned by non-profit organizations in
recent years. This evidence is drawn from information provided to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on tax forms filed by non-profits. Non-
Hilgert (1998, p. 102) reports that, as of year-end 1994, 501(c)(3) organizations had $349
bfflion of (book) investments in securities (including stocks and corporate bonds), or 35
percent of their total (book) assets of $992 billion. These book figures are likely to overstate
the fraction of tradable securities in portfolios, but not all of the $992 bfflion of assets are
used for investment purposes.Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business Income Tax67
profit organizations with gross unrelated business income of $1,000 or
more are required to file with the IRS Form 990-T, which isused to
determine the size of any tax obligation the organization incurs on its
unrelated business income. Form 990-T requires non-profit organiza-
tions to report detailed information concerning their unrelated business
activities. Since individual Form 990-T filings are confidential, it is not
possible for researchers to analyze them directly; consequently, the only
available Form 990-T information consists of national aggregates re-
ported by the IRS on the basis of selected samples of Form 990-T filings.
Table 1 summarizes recent experience with the UBIT in the United
States. In 1994, 35,657 organizations filed Form 990-T. These organiza-
tions had total gross unrelated business income of $5.4 billion, against
which they claimed aggregate deductions of $6.5 billion, for a net unre-
lated business loss of $1.1 billion. Organizations exhibit considerable
heterogeneity: the net incomes of the 18,588 organizations for which
unrelated business income is positive sum to $643 million (which there-
fore represents taxable profits), while the 17,070 organizations without
positive unrelated business income had losses that sum to $1.77 billion.
Non-profit organizations paid total UBIT of $195 million in 1994.
While of unimpressive magnitude compared to other components of
federal tax receipts, the $195-million tax payment in 1994 reflects rapid
recent growth in UBIT collections. Table 1 indicates that non-profit orga-
TABLE 1
Unrelated Business Income and UBIT, 1990-1994
Net Net
Gross incomeincome:
unrel. bus. Total less taxable Total
No. ofincomedeductionsdeficitprofitDeficitUBIT
Year returns($ mil.) ($ mu.) ($ mil.)($ mu.)($ mu.)($ mu.)
Note: The table entries are population estimates for all U.S. exempt organizations drawn from Form
990-T filings between 1990 and 1994. "Net income less deficit" is the difference between gross unre-
lated business income and deductions claimed against unrelated business income. "Net income: tax-
able profit" is the difference between gross unrelated business income and deductions, for all exempt
organizations for which this difference is positive. "Deficit" is the difference between gross unrelated
business income and deductions for all exempt organizations for which this difference is negative.
Dollar figures are millions of current dollars.
Source: Riley (1995, 1997, 1998).






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business Income Tax69
nizations had UBIT obligations of only $99.1 million in 1990, and that
annual UBIT collections rose steadily between 1990 and 1994.
Entries in Table 1 describe the unrelated business income and UBIT of
the entire non-profit sector. Table 2 provides the same information for
1994, distinguishing organizations by the Internal Revenue Code sec-
tions under which they are tax-exempt. As Table 2 indicates, 501(c)(3)
organizations report more than half of aggregate gross unrelated busi-
ness income in 1994 ($3.1 billion out of a total of $5.4 billion), and paid
one-third of the total UBIT in that year. Other organizational types with
gross unrelated business income exceeding $200 million include 501(c)(4)
organizations (civic leagues, social welfare organizations, and local asso-
ciations of employees), 501(c)(6) organizations (business leagues, cham-
bers of commerce, real estate boards, and like organizations), 501(c)(7)
organizations (social and recreational clubs), and 501(c)(9) organizations
(voluntary employees' beneficiary associations).
The size and diversity of the 501(c)(3) population suggests that many
different types of organizations within this category may earn unrelated
business income. Table 3 presents a breakdown of unrelated business
income and other financial information for differing types of 501(c)(3)
organizations in 1993 (comparable figures being unavailable for 1994).
The information presented in Table 3 was compiled by the IRS based on
a matched sample of Form 990 and Form 990-T filings for 1993 (and
reported in Riley, 1997). Form 990 is the information return that all non-
profits (other than religious organizations) are required to file annually
with the IRS; they are public documents, and therefore are in principle
available for researchers to use. The IRS selects for coding a sample of
Form 990 filings stratified on asset size, with large organizations the
most likely to be included in the sample.
The entries in Table 3 are based on information from organizations in
the Form 990 sample that also file Form 990-T in 1993. Sampling weights
used in the construction of the Form 990 sample are then inverted to
generate the population estimates reported in Table 3. Since the sam-
pling weights used to generate the numbers reported in Table 3 are not
conditioned on earning unrelated business income (and therefore filing
Form 990-T), inverting these weights does not, in general, produce accu-
rate population estimates. For example, the estimated (based on sam-
pling weights) 6,312 501(c)(3) organizations filing Form 990-T does not
accord with the separately available (and more reliable) 1993 figure of
9,246. But patterns evident in Table 3 are likely to be reproduced in the
population, since there is no particular reason that any biases introduced
by inverting the sampling weights wifi differ systematically between
types of 501(c)(3) organizations.70Hines
TABLE 3
Income, Expenses, and Unrelated Business Income of 501(c) (3)
Organizations, Matched Sample, 1993
Note: The table presents information from a matched (stratified) sample of Form 990 and Form 990-T
filings by 501(c)(3) organizations for 1993. Data from only those organizations that are included in the
stratified sample, and that ifie both Form 990 and Form 990-T, are the basis of the figures; sampling
weights are used to construct population estimates. Income and expense items reported are adjusted
by the IRS to make financial reporting entries (from Form 990) comparable with tax entries (reported
on Form 990-T). Dollar amounts are millions of current dollars. Organizations are classified by type of
activity.
Source: Riley (1997).
(a) A "publicly-supported organization" must receive at least one-third of its total support from govern-
mental units, from contributions made directly or indirectly by the general public, or from a combina-
tion of these sources; less than one-third of its funds may come from internal sources. "Publicly-
supported organizations" are organized and operated in a manner to attract new and additional public
or governmental support on a continuous basis.
The IRS adjusts income and expense items reported in Table 3 in order
to make financial reporting entries (from Form 990) comparable with tax
entries (reported on Form 990-T). Organizations are classified by type of
activity, all but one of which is self-explanatory. A "publicly supported
organization" must receive at least one-third of its total support from
governmental units, from contributions made directly or indirectly by
the general public, or from a combination of these sources; less than one-
third of its funds may come from internal sources. Furthermore, "pub-














($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions)
Total 6,312$ 222,654$ 233,513$ 2,435 $ 2,447
Educational institu-
tion or school
533 39,577 41,173 228 220
Hospital 1,159 140,022 135,379 848 924
Hospital research
organization









301 14,222 13,801 438 373
Publicly-supported
organization(a)
4,132 259,000 30,389 883 892
Other 9 871 857 4 3Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business Income Tax71
TABLE 4
Source of Gross Unrelated Business Income, 1994
Note: The table distinguishes sources of unrelated business income reported by all non-profit organiza-
tions filing Form 990-T in 1994. Income items reported are gross of various deductions claimed on Form
990-T. Dollar amounts are thousands of current dollars.
Source: Riley (1998).
to attract new and additional public or governmental support on a con-
tinuing basis.
The evidence reported in Table 3 indicates that the gross unrelated
business income of 501(c)(3) organizations is a mere 1.1 percent of their
total income, and that their unrelated business expenses are 1.1 percent
of their total expenses. Net unrelated business income (gross income
minus expenses) is therefore of trivial magnitude relative to other reve-
nue sources. Hospitals account for roughly one-third of the unrelated
business income of 501(c)(3) organizations, a sizable fraction but signifi-
cantly less than their share of the 501(c)(3) sector's finances. Publicly-
supported organizations, educational institutions, and organizations
that support other charitable organizations also earn significant amounts
of unrelated business income.8
Unrelated business income earned by non-profit organizations in 1994
takes many forms, of which major categories are detailed in Table 4. Of
It is worth bearing in mind that the burden of the UBIT may be felt most keenly by organi-
zations for whom the tax is so burdensome that they elect not to earn any unrelated business
income and therefore do not appear in the figures reported in Table 3. Of course, it would be







Total $ 5,379,838 35,657
Gross profit (less loss) from sales and services 2,700,302 14,147
Capital-gain net income 144,612 513
Net capital loss (trusts only) 242 78
Net gain (less loss), sales of non-capital assets 3,644 309
Income (less loss) from partnerships 134,379 6,295
Rental income 120,912 3,722
Unrelated debt-financed income 347,868 2,358
Investment income (less loss) 274,450 5,556
Income from controlled organizations 45,506 1,376
Exploited exempt-activity income, except adver-
tising
89,535 801
Advertising income 942,711 7,582
Other income (less loss) 576,161 6,33372Hines
the total unrelated business income of $5.4 billion, half ($2.7 billion)
consists of gross profit (less loss) from sales and services. Sales and
services income is significant not only in terms of its aggregate level, but
also in terms of the number of non-profit organizations-14,147 out of a
total of 35,657 Form 990-T filersreporting such income. Other impor-
tant sources of unrelated business income include advertising income
($943 million), other income ($576 million), and various sources of invest-
ment income.
The available aggregate information indicates that the non-profit sec-
tor's many sources of unrelated business income generate very little tax
liability from the UBIT. Partly this reflects the fact that many organiza-
tions claim deductions against gross unrelated business income that are
large enough to produce tax losses, but largely it reflects the absence of
much unrelated business activity. While the reported figures do not
include the operations of taxable subsidiaries, there is no evidence that
this omission has a large effect on the aggregate numbers.9 The next
section analyzes the characteristics of 501(c)(3) organizations with busi-
ness operations that are unrelated to their exempt purposes.
5. WHO HAS UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME?
The behavior of non-profit organizations that are subject to the UBIT
reveals important information concerning their ability and willingness to
earn unrelated business income in spite of the associated tax liability. This
section analyzes information drawn from Form 990 filings of non-profit
organizations in 1989. These information returns do not contain any detail
on a non-profit organization's unrelated business income, nor do they
indicate whether or not a non-profit organization had positive UBIT liabil-
ity in 1989. They do, however, have entries indicating whether the filing
organization was also obliged to file Form 990-T for 1989, which is almost a
perfect indicator of having gross unrelated business income in excess of
$1,000. Consequently, it is possible to use publicly-available data reported
on Form 990 to analyze the determinants of whether an organization has
$1,000 or more of gross unrelated business income.
Prior to 1997, any interest, rents, royalties, and annuities received from taxable subsid-
iaries owned at least 80 percent by parent non-profit organizations were treated as unre-
lated business income and therefore taxable under the UBIT. The Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997 reduced the ownership share necessary for application of the UB1T to 50 percent and
introduced other changes intended to prevent tax avoidance through the use of subsid-
iaries of non-profit organizations. The U.S. Congress, Joint Coniniittee on Taxation (1997,
pp. 239-240) estimates the revenue impact of these changes to be less than $5 million per
year, reflecting, in part, the modest volume of non-profit business activity conducted
through taxable subsidiaries.Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business Income Tax73
5.1 Unrelated Business Income of 501(c)(3)s
Table 5 presents the results of logit regressions in which the dependent
variable equals one if an organization has gross unrelated business in-
come greater than $1,000 in 1989, and equals zero otherwise. Indepen-
dent variables include: book values of total assets at year-end 1989,
administrative expenses in 1989, program service expenses in 1989, total
TABLE 5
Unrelated Business Income of 501(c)(3)s, 1989
Note: The columns report coefficients from logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals one
if a 501(c)(3) organization has unrelated business income greater than $1,000 in 1989, and equals zero
otherwise. "Assets" equals the gross book value of year-end 1989 assets; "Total Expense" equals the
sum of administrative and service expenses; "Total Receipts" equals the sum of contributions and
grants. Regression samples exclude organizations with asset sizes below the fifth percentile of the
sample, and those observations in which any independent variable (prior to taking logs) is less than
$100. All variables are measured in 1989 dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coefficient
2 3 4 5
-11.2206-11.3168-9.9958-26.8112
(0.3868) (0.5942)(12.9293)(22.3267)
0.2507 0.4215 0.2181 3.3733





0.2298 0.1994 0.2255 0.1977
(0.0350) (0.0573) (0.0352) (0.0576)
0.1860 0.0799 0.1875 0.0826

























No. of observations 8,59474Hines
TABLE 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Regression Variables
1989 large sample
(Tables 5 and 7)
1989 sample of organiza-
tions with either unre-
lated business income
or profits from iriven-





































expenses (defined as the sum of administrative and program service
expenses), contributions received in 1989, government grants received
in 1989, and total receipts (defined as the sum of contributions and
government grants). Variable means and standard deviations are re-
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specifications, second and third powers of log assets are included as
independent variables.10
Larger organizations are the most likely to report unrelated business
income. The 0.2645 coefficient on in Assets in column 1 of Table 5 is large
and differs significantly from zero. Evaluating the logit function at the
sample mean of the independent variables, this coefficient implies that,
as an organization's asset size doubles (and nothing else changes), ithas
3.7 percent greater likelthood of reporting unrelated business income.
Since the sample mean likelihood of reporting unrelated business in-
come is 22 percent, a difference of 3.7 percent is sizable.
The positive correlation between unrelated business income and asset
size is not surprising. Quite apart from the factors that are idiosyncratic
to unrelated business income, the larger an organization is, the more
likely it is to have any given source of income. Size may also be correlated
with other, unmeasured characteristics that encourage organizations to
earn unrelated business income, but these are inevitably very difficult to
distinguish from the pure effect of organizational size.11
Conditioning on asset size, organizations with greater expenses, par-
ticularly service-related expenses, are more likely to have unrelated busi-
ness income. The 0.4135 estimated coefficient on inTotal Expense in
column 1 of Table 5 differs significantly from zero and implies that there
is a positive correlation between total expenses and earning unrelated
business income. Again evaluating the logit function at sample means,
doubling an organization's service and administrative expenses (and
holding other characteristics constant) is associated with 5.9 percent
greater likelihood of reporting gross unrelated business income. The
regression reported in column 2 separates service expenses and adminis-
trative expenses; both are positively correlated with earning unrelated
business income.
Organizations receiving high levels of contributions and government
grants are less likely than are other organizations to report unrelated
business income, conditional on asset size and other observable charac-
teristics. While the estimated 0.0456 coefficient on in Total Receipts in
column 1 of Table 5 differs statistically from zero, it implies a smaller
10In order to prevent observations of very small non-profits from exerting undue influence
on the regression results, regression samples exclude the smallest (measured by year-end
assets) 5 percent of the sample. Individual regressions exclude observations in which data
are missing or independent variables (prior to logging) have values less than $100.
11Another, possibly important consideration is that large organizations may have the
greatest ability to generate sizable deductions against gross unrelated business income
through the allocation of joint costs. Adept cost allocation reduces the effective tax rate due
to the UBIT, as Sansing (1998) notes.76Hines
absolute effect on unrelated business income than do the estimated coef-
ficients on total assets and total expensesreflecting, in part, the
smaller magnitude of receipts from contributions and government
grants. Evaluating the logit function at sample means, 100 percent
higher total receipts are associated with 0.6 percent lower likelthood of
reporting unrelated business income. The specifications reported in col-
umns 3 and 5 provide estimates of separate effects of contributions and
government grants, doing so from a sample consisting of organizations
that report both contributions and government grants in excess of $100.
In this sample of 2,891 organizations, contributions have an insignificant
effect on unrelated business income, while government grants have a
significant negative effect.
One of the difficulties of interpreting the evidence reported in the first
three columns of Table 5 comes from the fact that several of the indepen-
dent variables represent differing measures of an organization's size. To
be sure, the inclusion of log assets as a regressor means that the effects of
other variables are measured in a way that is conditioned on the size of
an organization's assets, but there remains the possibility that estimated
coefficients on variables other than assets reflect nonlinearities in the
effect of organizational size on unrelated business income. The regres-
sions reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 include as regressors three
powers of log assets in order to absorb the effects of simple nonlin-
earities. The results are quite consistent with those reported in columns
1 through 3.
The regressions reported in Table 5 indicate that large organizations
with many expenses and few receipts of contributions and government
grants are the more likely to report earning unrelated business income
in 1989. This pattern is consistent with a preference on the part of
501(c)(3) organizations not to divert their energies into earning unre-
lated business income, but a willingness to do so when feeling financial
pressure from ongoing operations. A second interpretation of the evi-
dence is that organizations earning unrelated business income spend
more and attract fewer contributions and government grants than do
other organizations. And a third possibility is simply that organizations
differ in their opportunities to earn business income; that such opportu-
nities appear most often among organizations with many expenses and
few receipts of contributions and government grants. In order to distin-
guish between these interpretations of the regressions reported in Ta-
ble 5, it is useful to juxtapose this evidence with similar regressions in
which the dependent variable indicates whether an organization has
business income coming from sources that are "related" to exempt
purposes.Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business Income Tax77
5.2 Inventory Sales by 501(c)(3)s
Non-profit organizations often supplement their revenues with mem-
bership dues, rental income, income from special events and activities,
and profits from sales of inventory items. Of these, sales of inventory
items are the most likely to require organizations to have financial and
commercial infrastructure and to reflect business opportunities avail-
able to non-profit organizations. Sales of inventory items need not
constitute unrelated business income; in the sample of organizations
analyzed in Table 5, only 31 percent of those reporting gross profits of
$1,000 or more from sales of inventory items also report gross unrelated
business income of $1,000 or more (from all sources). For the economy
as a whole in 1994, 501(c)(3) organizations report inventory sales of $7.2
billion, on which they earned $3.2 billion of gross profit.12 Sales of
inventory items typically do not constitute unrelated business income,
and inventory sales exceed total unrelated business income in the
501(c)(3) sector.
Table 7 reports the results of regressions in which the dependent
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if a 501(c)(3) organi-
zation has at least $1,000 of gross profits from sales of inventory items in
1989, and zero otherwise. Estimated coefficients in these logit regres-
sions differ in sign and magnitude from the coefficients (reported in
Table 5) estimated for unrelated business income. Greater asset size is
associated with higher likelthood of reporting profits from inventory
sales, but the effect of asset size is insignificant in all but the regression
reported in colunm 3. More striking is the sign pattern of estimated
coefficients on expense and receipt items. Organizations with greater
expenses, particularly program service expenses, are less likely than
others to report earning profits from inventory sales, while organiza-
tions with greater receipts of contributions and government grants, par-
ticularly contributions, are more likely than others to report earning
profits from inventory sales.
These patterns differ sharply from those reported in Table 5. They
suggest that the organizational characteristics associated with earning
unrelated business income reflect something other than simple business
opportunities, or at least those that are expressed by selling inventory
items. Suppose that the unobserved characteristics of an organization
that are correlated with earning unrelated business income are also corre-
lated with asset size and total expenses, and are negatively correlated
with receipts of contributions and government grants. If so, then the
' See Hilgert (1998, p. 104).78Hines
TABLE 7
Profits from Inventory Sales by 501(c)(3)s, 1989
No. of observations 8,594 7,483 2,891 7,483 2,891
Note: The columns report coefficients from logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals one
if a 501(c)(3) organization has gross profits greater than $1,000 from sales of inventory items in 1989,
and equals zero otherwise. "Assets" equals the gross book value of year-end 1989 assets; "Total
Expense" equals the sum of administrative and service expenses; "Total Receipts" equals the sum of
contributions and grants. Regression samples exclude organizations with asset sizes below the fifth
percentile of the sample, and those observations in which any independent variable (prior to taking
logs) is less than $100. All variables are measured in 1989 dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses.
estimated coefficients reported in Table 5 reflect nothing of a causal
nature, but instead spurious correlations. If the same unobserved charac-
teristics are also correlated with earning profits from sales of inventory
items, then the sign pattern reported in Table 5 should also appear in
Table 7-but it does not.
The issue of unobserved organizational characteristics suggests a re-
lated but more powerful test of the effect of various independent van-
Coefficient
Term Regression 1 2 3 4 5
Constant -3.1980-3.0710-3.3026-7.2036-13.2321
(0.2773) (0.2992) (0.4578) (8.1381)(13.9001)
In Assets 0.0203 0.0535 0.4060 0.9967 2.1491
(0.0281) (0.0312) (0.0563) (1.5467) (2.5818)
(In Assets)2 -0.0680-0.1009
(0.0970) (0.1583)
(In Assets)3 0.0016 0.0019
(0.0020) (0.0032)
In Total Expense -0.0369
(0.0247)
ln Service Expense -0.2509-0.4307-0.2557-0.4240
(0.0306) (0.0535) (0.0308) (0.0540)
in Admin. Expense 0.1790 0.0430 0.1801 0.0431
(0.0293) (0.0471) (0.0293) (0.0474)
ln Total Receipts 0.1229 0.1386 0.1360
(0.0156) (0.0171) (0.0171)
in Contributions 0.1474 0.1468
(0.0304) (0.0304)
in Grants -0.0504 -0.0497
(0.0265) (0.0269)
In Likeithood -3488.6-3136.4-1418.8-3135.2-1418.3Non-Profit Business Activity and the Unrelated Business Income Tax79
TABLE 8
501(c) (3) Organizations with Inventory Sales and Unrelated Business
Income, 1989
Unrelated business Unrelated business
income dummy = 1 income dummy = 0
Note: The table presents numbers of 501(c)(3) organizations in the Form 990 sample with profits from
inventory sales and with unrelated business income in 1989. The unrelated business income dummy
variable equals one if an organization reports gross unrelated business income of at least $1,000 in
1989, and equals zero otherwise. Similarly, the inventory sales dummy equals one if an organization
reports gross profits of at least $1,000 from sales of inventory items in 1989, and equals zero other
wise. The total sample of 8,594 organizations includes only those organizations in the Form 990
sample reporting total expenses and total receipts of over $100 in 1989, and excludes organizations
with asset sizes below the fifth percentile of the sample.
ables on whether an organization earns unrelated business income or
profits from inventory sales. Table 8 classifies the large sample of 8,594
organizations by whether or not they have unrelated business income
and whether or not they have gross profits from sales of inventory items.
In this sample, 5,837 organizations report neither type of income, while
379 report both. Of particular interest are the 2,378 organizations report-
ing either unrelated business income, or gross sales profits, but not
both. These 2,378 organizations share the characteristic of being able and
wiUing to generate income with business activity, but they differ in the
type of activity they undertake. It is possible to use this sample to esti-
mate the determinants of reporting one type of income and not the
other.
Table 9 reports the results of logit regressions in which the dependent
variable equals one if an organization has unrelated business income but
no sales profits, and equals zero if it has no unrelated business income
but positive sales profits. The sample consists of the 2,378 observations
with either unrelated business income or profits from sales in 1989.13
The results reported in Table 9 are quite consistent with those reported
in Tables 5 and 7. Organizations with greater expenses, particularly
service expenses, are more likely than others to report unrelated busi-
ness income rather than profits from sales of "related" inventory. Contri-
butions and government grants reduce the likelihood that an organiza-
tion will report unrelated business income instead of profits from sales of
"related" inventory.
u Chamberlain (1980) discusses the properties of the fixed-effects logit estimator in panel
estimation, which is adapted to the current cross-sectional application.
Inventory sales dummy = 1 379 850
Inventory sales dummy = 0 1,528 5,83780Hines
TABLE 9
Unrelated Business Income vs. Profits from Inventory Sales by
No. of observations 2,378 2,155 982 2,155 982
Note: The sample is limited to 501(c)(3) organizations with either unrelated business income or gross
profits of at least $1,000 from inventory sales (but not both) in 1989. The columns report coefficients
from logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals one if unrelated business income is at
least $1,000 and gross profits from inventory sales are less than $1,000, and the dependent variable
equals zero if gross profits from inventory sales are at least $1,000 and unrelated business income is
less than $1,000. "Assets" equals the gross book value of year-end 1989 assets; "Total Expense" equals
the sum of administrative and service expenses; "Total Receipts" equals the sum of contributions and
grants. Regression samples exclude organizations with asset sizes below the fifth percentile of the
sample, and those observations in which any independent variable (prior to taking logs) is less than
$100. All variables are measured in 1989 dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses.
5.3 Hospitals
The 501(c)(3) category encompasses an extremely heterogeneous group
of non-profit organizations, making it a challenge to generalize about
their motives and also making it difficult to rule out the possibility that
501(c)(3)s, 1989
Coefficient
Regression 1 2 3 4 5
-8.7158-8.1152-9.0310-13.2365-14.0390
(0.5604) (0.5855)(0.9342)(18.9341)(33.8831)








0.6622 0.9291 0.6644 0.9244
(0.0660)(0.1083) (0.0665)(0.1090)
0.0204 0.1709 0.0198 0.1721
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unobserved heterogeneity is responsible for the patterns that are evident
in the regressions. While it is possible to classify non-profit orga-
nizations by their primary activities and analyze each organizational
type separately, doing so greatly reduces the statistical power of the
estimatesand does not solve all of the problems raised by organiza-
tional heterogeneity. Since the sample is stratified on asset size, hospi-
tals are sufficiently well represented in the sample (2,173 of the 8,594
observations) to afford reliable estimation of coefficients exclusively from
the hospital subsample. The advantage of estimating the regressions on
only the hospital subsample is that the resulting coefficients are thereby
less likely to reflect any spurious correlations induced by organizational
heterogeneity.
Table 10 presents estimated coefficients from regressions that are iden-
tical to those reported in Table 5 but that are run only on observations of
501(c)(3) hospitals. The coefficient pattern is remarkably similar to that
reported in Table 5. Asset size is positively correlated with reporting
unrelated business income, as are total expenses, particularly service
expenses. Receipt of contributions and govermnent grants, particularly
government grants, is negatively associated with reporting unrelated
business income. Non-profit hospitals are the subject of extensive re-
search that is largely devoted to identifying any differences between
their behavior and the behavior of for-profit, taxable hospitals.'4 The
evidence reported in Tables 5 and 10 suggests that the financial determi-
nants of unrelated business activity by non-profit hospitals are similar to
those that affect non-profit organizations outside the health area.
5.4 Implications
The estimation results are consistent with the interpretation that non-
profit organizations prefer not to engage in unrelated business activities,
but do so if they feel pressing needs for additional sources of finance.
There are other possible interpretations of the evidence, but none that
accord consistently with the patterns of behavior evident in the data.
Since the financial constraints facing non-profit organizations are, to
one degree or another, under the control of those organizations, it is
possible that organizations flush with cash from unrelated business ac-
tivities spend their cash on program-related services and fail to pursue
sources of contributions and government grants. There are two reasons
why it is unlikely that the direction of causality works in this way. First,
the aggregate figures make it clear that unrelated business income can-
not have a major effect on organizational finances even under the best of
14 See Sloan (1998) for a recent survey.82Hines
TABLE 10
Unrelated Business Income of 501(c) (3) Hospitals, 1989
Coefficient
No. of observations 2,173 1,845 512 1,845 512
Note: The sample is limited to non-profit hospitals. The columns report coefficients from logit regres-
sions in which the dependent variable equals one if a 501(c)(3) hospital has unrelated business
income of at least $1,000 in 1989, and equals zero otherwise. "Assets" equals the gross book value of
year-end 1989 assets; "Total Expense" equals the sum of administrative and service expenses; "Total
Receipts" equals the sum of contributions and grants. Regression samples exclude organizations
with asset sizes below the fifth percentile of the sample, and those observations in which any
independent variable (prior to taking logs) is less than $100. All variables are measured in 1989
dollars. Standard errors are in parentheses.
circumstances; gross unrelated business revenues are just too small for
that. Unrelated business activities instead represent one component of
what are likely to be more comprehensive efforts to strengthen the fi-
nances of organizations in financial need. Second, if income generated
by unrelated business activity has a major impact on spending and on
the pursuit of contributions and government grants, then it is difficult to
Regression 1 2 3 4 5
-13.3222-12.9689-13.0232-67.792242.4897
(0.8760) (0.9395)(1.8527)(79.3376) (106.5201)
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understand why the same is not true of income generated by sales of
inventory items.
Another possibility is that the estimated coefficients reflect nothing
more than reporting behavior on the part of non-profit organizations.
Since unrelated business income is self-reported, and since non-profit
organizations are virtually never audited by the IRS, organizations have
incentives to misreport any otherwise-taxable activities as being either
unrelated to charitable purpose, and therefore exempt from tax, or else
unprofitable due to large deductions from income. The difficulty with
this interpretation is that reporting considerations should generally bias
against finding the results presented in Tables 5-10, since organizations
with pressing financial needs are the least likely to reveal to the IRS that
they earn unrelated business income. To be sure, once gross unrelated
business income is reported, threadbare organizations have strong incen-
tives to overstateor to interpret generouslyany available deductions
against that income. Indeed, it may be the coincidence of financial need
and unrelated business income that is responsible for the (reported)
unprofitability of aggregate unrelated business activity in the aggregate
statistics.
The evidence suggests that the burden of the UBIT falls most heavily
on organizations with the greatest financial need. There is more than
one way to view such incidence. One view is that subjecting such organi-
zations to the UBIT hinders their attempts to obtain needed funds to
further their exempt purposes. Another view is that organizations with
great financial needs are those that spend beyond their means or are
unable to attract public contributions or government grants. Evaluations
of the UBIT turn largely on the organizational attributes that are associ-
ated with earning unrelated business income, and about these we have
only indirect evidence.
6. CONCLUSION
The Unrelated Business Income Tax raises very little direct revenue for
the federal government, but serves the function of discouraging most
non-profit organizations from undertaking unrelated business activity.
The evidence from information returns filed with the IRS suggests that
501(c)(3) organizations are generally reluctant to engage in unrelated
business activity, typically doing so when pressed by strong financial
needs. This reluctance on the part of 501(c)(3) organizations reflects their
own perceptions of the costlines of diverting organizational focus from
charitable activities, as well as the cost of possibly alienating employees,
contributors, and other supporters. The general unwillingness of non-84Hines
profit organizations to undertake unrelated business activity is an impor-
tant consideration in evaluating whether the UBIT is necessary in order
to prevent "unfair" competition between non-profit and for-profit firms.
In addition, the inabifity of non-profit organizations to deduct from tax-
able income the special organizational costs they incur in earning unre-
lated business income implies that the UBIT may reduce the efficiency of
resource allocation.
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